Introduction
The Nuclear Engineering Research Group (NERG) from the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC) has a collaboration agreement with a Spanish, Pressurized Water
Reactor (PWR) Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The main objective of the collaboration is to study and apply the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methodology for riskinformed decision making processes. One of the research activities within the frame of the collaboration is devoted to the Fire PSA. The goal of the Fire PSA related research activity is to develop support tools for risk-informed decision making.
The assessment of plant configurations in accordance with Section (a) (4) of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule (MR)) [1] and high-level guidance in Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) [2] is of current practice nowadays in nuclear power plants. However, methods to incorporate fire-related risk into these current practices are still under development and assessment.
The objective of this paper is to present innovative methods to incorporate firerelated risk into the current assessment of plant configurations. A method to identify Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) significant for fire-related risk is presented.
A method to identify Fire Zones c (FZ) which are candidate for potential risk management actions is also presented. The development of these methods was restricted to the compulsory use of the Fire PSA of the NPP. The products of these methods are matrix structures assessed by means of risk criteria. The NPP PSA team has provided technical guidance throughout the development of the methods. The methodology followed to c A fire zone is not necessarily bounded by fire barriers. Zones are often delimited taking into account the FPSs present in each area. delineate the matrices is described in section 2. The quantification of the matrices is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the risk criteria used to evaluate the results, and sections 5, 6 and 7 contain the assessment of the results.
2.
Matrices delineation. Selection of representative basic events
Matrices definition
The Fire Protection Systems (FPS) and Key Safety Functions (KSF)
Unavailability Matrix (UM) is developed to identify significant SSCs for fire-related risk. 
Matrices delineation
The rows of the UM matrix host all the fire protection systems within the scope of the Fire PSA. Likewise, the rows of the FRM contain all the fire zones analyzed in the Fire PSA detailed analysis. Columns host key safety functions' representative basic events for both UM and FRM. A screening analysis has been carried out for the purpose of selecting basic events which are significant to and exclusively represent one of the KSFs. Figure 1 shows the methodology followed to select the elements to be introduced in the UM.
< Figure 1 >

Introduction of FPS in the UM
The Fire PSA detailed analysis only includes four generic types of fire protection systems: Prompt suppression (PS), automatic detection (PDA), automatic suppression 
Screening analysis for KSFs' representative basic events
The fundamental safety functions of defense in depth are: Reactivity control, removal of heat from the core, and confinement of radioactive materials [7] . The accomplishment of these functions in all of the operations modes avoids the initiation and/or progression of accidental sequences. In this paper, the fundamental safety The screening analysis for selecting KSFs' representative basic events is based on a risk importance analysis. The importance analysis has been applied to the Boolean equations of unavailability of the internal events' mitigation headers. All those basic events whose Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) [8] importance measure is greater than a specific value are selected for further analysis. The screening RAW value is set to ten.
The screening value is more restrictive than that for other applications where the plant's CDF is evaluated because the quantity of basic events evaluated in a header is much 
Matrices quantification
The Fire PSA RiskSpectrum® model of the Spanish NPP provides the core damage Boolean equation for each fire case, and each fire zone included in the analysis.
However, it does not provide the whole plant's core damage Boolean equation. The CDF of the whole plant is the risk measure used in the UM. Therefore, the CDF of the plant is quantified by means different to RiskSpectrum®. Equation 1 is used to calculate the plant's CDF associated with each element of the unavailability matrix.
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has three degrees of freedom: the zone (z), the FPS (s), and the KSF (k). The acronym dCDF refers to the core damage frequency related to a fire zone. So to say, a dCDF is a single and specific value of core damage frequency, independent from other dCDFs, which is solely associated with fires postulated in a specific fire zone. Each dCDF is considered as the contribution of a fire zone to the CDF of the plant. In average The risk measure assessed in the FRM is the contribution of each fire zone (i.e. dCDF) to the NPP's fire CDF when SSCs representative of KSFs are unavailable. These dCDFs are used in the terms of Equation 1 (i.e. dCDFz, OK, k). Both matrices are then calculated using the same methodology.
Quantification in RiskSpectrum®
The objective of the quantification in RiskSpectrum® is to obtain all the fire zones' contributions to plant's fire CDF (dCDFs in Equation 1 ). The procedure shown in 
Matrices calculation and completion
The calculation of the UM elements has been completed using two Python 
Risk assessment criteria applied to evaluate the unavailability matrix
The risk assessment criteria (see Table 1 ) applied to evaluate the UM have been provided by the Spanish NPP. These criteria are based on the concepts of exposure time (TE) and accumulated increment of core damage probability (∆CDP) of the situation assessed (see Equation 2 ). The risk assessment criteria are similar to what is proposed by the Spanish regulatory body for the assessment of findings [9] .
∆CDF is the difference between the CDF of each matrix element (CDFa, i.e. the CDF of the plant restricted to the unavailability of an FPS and/or the unavailability of a KSF representative basic event) and the plant's reference fire CDF. The ∆CDP threshold to differentiate between not significant and significant risk is set to 1.0E-06, in compliance with other risk criteria that make use of this figure [5] [9] . The metric used to evaluate the risk is the TE needed to reach the ∆CDP threshold. CDFa from the criteria in column 2. The plant's reference fire CDF is used for that purpose. The value of the plant's reference fire CDF is roughly 9.83E-06 (1/r*y).
< If the situation is the consequence of maintenance, the maintenance can last as much time as needed. For the low or moderate region of risk, the ∆CDP threshold of 1.0E-06 is reached after 3 days, and before 7 days, of operation under the situation assessed.
Corrective actions should be taken to fix the situation assessed before 7 days have passed.
If the situation is the consequence of maintenance, the maintenance can last as many as 7
days. For the high region of risk, the ∆CDP threshold of 1.0E-06 is reached before 3 days of operation under the situation assessed. Corrective actions should be taken to fix the situation assessed at most before 3 days have passed. If the situation is the consequence of maintenance, the maintenance could last 3 days at most. To enter the very high region of risk, the CDF of the situation assessed has to be higher than 1.0E-03. This is an unacceptable situation. Corrective actions should be taken immediately after the situation triggers and the plant may have to be shutdown. The situation cannot be consequence of an online maintenance. An online maintenance associated with such a high value of CDF cannot and will not be allowed.
The unavailability matrix
The majority of the UM matrix elements (see figure 2) , namely, a 79% of elements, belong to the very low risk region (green). The situations described by the elements in the green region are not a safety concern and do not require corrective actions as long as the plant takes a suitable time to return to normal operation. The fire-related risk significant matrix elements (yellow or above, see Table 2 ) are mainly localized in six columns (KSF representatives) and one row (FPS). The matrix elements of these six columns and one row are all belonging to a significant level of fire-related risk. Besides, there is a small quantity of isolated combinations of unavailability whose fire-related risk is significant. These isolated combinations are the only noticeable impact of the unavailability of FPS aside from the yellow row. The unavailability of FPSs, apart from the yellow row and those isolated combinations, does not significantly affect the matrix results and, so, the fire-related risk. The fire-related risk significant combinations of unavailability are mostly influenced by the unavailability of KSF representatives.
< Table 2 should be included in the maintenance rule.
Uncertainty analysis for the unavailability matrix
Introduction to the uncertainty analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the uncertainty associated with the development and quantification of the UM. The goal is to conclude whether the tool is robust and the results provided are trustworthy enough. The target of the analysis is to estimate the mean and the 95 percentile of the UM matrix elements so as to compare them with the point estimate values provided by the methodology presented in section 3.
The only uncertainty-related data available for the development of the uncertainty analysis are the cumulative distribution functions and the probability density functions of the dCDFs used to compute the UM matrix elements (see section 3). RiskSpectrum® provides both functions in a discrete manner, their analytical expressions are unknown.
Methodology for the uncertainty analysis
The Monte Carlo method is used to carry out the uncertainty analysis because it suits the available data. The Monte Carlo method is sequentially applied to each matrix RiskSpectrum®'s uncertainty analysis algorithm for a specific made-up case.
RiskSpectrum®'s uncertainty analysis is also based upon the Monte Carlo method [10] .
A sensitivity analysis has been performed to decide that 10000 is the optimal number of simulations to be carried out per matrix element, executing the Matlab® script.
Results and conclusions of the uncertainty analysis
The 95 of the matrix elements which ascend to the directly superior risk category, a 74% (314) are already considered as risk significant. Besides, the small difference between the 95 percentile value and the point estimate value, and the overestimation fact, show that the uncertainty associated to the matrix analysis is low. The uncertainty analysis demonstrates that the UM is a robust tool. The results obtained are trustworthy enough as to be used in risk-informed decision making processes. Further research will be devoted to the use of sensitivity analyses in the assessment of model and assumption uncertainties for the risk significant cases.
7.
The fire zones and key safety functions fire risk matrix
The fire zones and key safety functions matrix (see figure 2 ) presents the contribution of each fire zone (i.e. dCDF, rows) to the plant's fire CDF (first row of the matrix) conditioned to the unavailability of KSF representative SSCs (columns). The fire protection systems are always in NORMAL state. The purpose of this matrix is to highlight those fire zones that can be the object of risk management actions when a KSF representative is unavailable.
Matrix elements highlighted within a column are the dCDFs which contribute the most to the plant's fire CDF associated with that column. Columns are independent from each other (i.e. they represent different situations). Only those highlighted dCDFs which belong to a plant's fire CDF whose associated risk is low / moderate or above (risk criteria in section 4) are actually significant from the point of view of risk. The zones related to those latter highlighted dCDFs are considered to be the main contributors to fire-related risk when the associated KSF representative (column) is unavailable, and are candidates to be the target of risk management actions.
The fire zones that contribute the most to the fire-related risk when the DC bar is unavailable (very high risk situation, see Table 2 ) are: the transfer panel and no train electrical equipment zone from the control building, the A train voltage measurement stations from the control building, and the east-south aisle zone from the electrical penetrations building. These zones are strong candidates to be the target of risk management actions when the DC bar is unavailable. For instance, brigade walkdowns could be introduced in these zones.
Conclusions
The Unavailability Matrix and the Fire Risk Matrix are methods to incorporate the fire-related risk into the assessment of plant configurations in accordance with the The risk assessment criteria applied to the unavailability matrix have been provided by the Spanish nuclear power plant. The majority of unavailability matrix elements belong to the very low risk region (green). The fire-related risk significant combinations of unavailability are mostly influenced by the unavailability of KSF representatives. The risk significant matrix elements are localized in six columns (KSF representatives) and one row (FPS, the control room fire suppression system). There is a small quantity of isolated combinations whose risk is significant. These combinations are the only noticeable impact of the unavailability of FPSs aside from the control room fire suppression system row. New statements and restrictions should be included in the maintenance rule to take into account the fire-related risk significant SSCs: a motor pump from the Auxiliary feedwater system, vital electric bars A and B, a DC bar, a pneumatic valve from the safeguards service water system, and a retention valve in the high pressure safety injection system. The uncertainty associated with the unavailability matrix analysis has been assessed by means of a Monte Carlo method. The uncertainty analysis demonstrates that the UM is a robust tool. The results obtained are trustworthy enough as to be used in risk-informed decision making processes. Further research will be devoted to the use of sensitivity analyses in the assessment of model and assumption uncertainties for the risk significant cases.
The FRM is used to identify those fire zones that are candidates for risk management actions due to its risk significance. The fire zones that contribute the most to the fire-related risk when the DC bar is unavailable (very high risk situation) are: the transfer panel and no train electrical equipment zone from the control building, the A train voltage measurement stations from the control building, and the east-south aisle zone from the electrical penetrations building. These zones are strong candidates to be the object of risk management actions when the DC bar is unavailable. For instance, brigade walkdowns could be introduced in these zones. 
